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The Problem of Democracy in Contexts of Polarization* 
 
Imer B. Flores** 
 
Abstract 
In this paper I argue that contemporary democracies all over the world are more polarized 
than ever and intend to analyze not only the conditions of possibility of a democracy, in 
general, and in contexts of polarization, in particular, but also the relationship between 
democracy and polarization. My claim is that polarization, if certain conditions are met, 
more than a problem it is a great opportunity to democracy and a greater democratization. 
Hence, I bring to mind that it was Ronald Dworkin, who recently asked about the 
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conditions of possibility of a democracy and its relationship with polarization by 
developing a partnership conception of democracy in contraposition to the majoritarian 
conception. Besides, I call into attention the classics that have emphasized the relationship 
between democracy and polarization, since Robert A. Dahl coined the term ‘polyarchy’, 
such as Samuel P Huntington and Norberto Bobbio. Finally, I conclude that against all 
odds polarization is a great opportunity for democracy and a greater democratization. 
 
Keywords: Democracy, Majority, Minority, Polarization. 
 
1. Introduction 
Revising the conditions of possibility in a democracy is a problem which demands a great 
deal of attention on its own (per se), but which in contexts characterized by increasing 
polarization deserves a greater awareness simply as a must (sine qua non). In fact, at the 
moment, our contemporary democracies all over the globe seem to be quite polarized or 
in the process of becoming even more.1 Let me advance that my aim is to discuss the 
conditions of possibility of a democracy, in general, and in polarized contexts, in 
particular. My hunch is that if democracy is possible here and there --in contexts 
characterized by their polarization-- it is possible everywhere if certain conditions are met 
                                                
1 Keep in mind, in addition to the Québéçois bloc and the separatist movement in Canada, the 
close presidential elections in the United States of America in 2000, Mexico in 2006, and Germany in 
2010; the hang parliamentary elections in both Australia and Belgium in 2010, and the closest ones --since 
1992-- in the United Kingdom also in 2010; and the fact that most systems with a ballotage system end up 
in the second round, for instance, Colombia, France and Peru in 2011. Clearly, polarization is not reduced 
to election day, but close or hung elections do exemplify it pretty well. 
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and what’s more it is polarization which gives us a hint of the (minimal) conditions of 
possibility of a democracy. 
Hence, I intend to analyze which are the conditions of possibility of a democracy, 
but I must first in section 2 emphasize which is the relation between democracy and 
polarization to check whether they are compatible or incompatible. For that purpose, i.e. 
to test their compatibility or incompatibility, we will bring to mind: first, two conceptions 
of “democracy”; and, second, four characterizations of “polarization”. Then, later on, in 
section 3 I will return to democracy and its conditions of possibility: if democracy and 
polarization are compatibles, polarization is a great opportunity for democracy and a 
greater democratization. 
2. Democracy and Polarization 
Let me recall that some years ago, in March 2006, a book titled Is Democracy Possible 
Here? Principles for a New Political Debate by Ronald Dworkin (2006) appeared, based 
in the Scribner Lectures that he delivered at Princeton University the previous year. 
Dworkin begins by acknowledging an increasing polarization between the two dominant 
cultures in the United States of America, represented by the ideologies of the two main 
political parties, who not only disagree about almost everything including the scope of 
their disagreements, but also --and even worse-- neither have nor show respect the one 
for the other and vice versa to the extent that he cautions: “We are no longer partners in 
self-government; our politics are rather a form of war.” (Dworkin 2006: 1) In addition, 
Dworkin warns that the split between the two poles may become an “unbridgeable gulf” 
if there is “no common ground to be found and no genuine argument to be had” in order 
to seek and eventually reach a broad consensus. On this regards, he adds: 
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Democracy can be healthy with no serious political argument if there is nevertheless a 
broad consensus about what is to be done. It can be healthy even if there is no consensus 
if it does have a culture of argument. But it cannot remain healthy with deep and bitter 
divisions and no real argument, because it then becomes only a tyranny of numbers. 
(Dworkin 2006: 6) 
 Notwithstanding, he advances that it is still possible to find some shared 
principles to make a national political debate possible and profitable (Dworkin 2006: 6-
7). To the extent that in his opinion it is necessary to reinvigorate the argumentative 
dimension of politics and as a consequence it is useful to deliberate and discuss (Dworkin 
2006: 8). As mentioned above, before proceeding to analyze which are the conditions of 
possibility of a democracy, we must emphasize which is the relation between democracy 
and polarization to check their (in)compatibility, by bringing to mind: first, two 
conceptions of “democracy”; and, second, four characterizations of “polarization”. 
A. Democracy 
According to its etymology --demos (people) and kratos (government, power or rule)--
“democracy” means “government, power or rule of the people”. It is prima facie a form 
of government in contraposition to other forms of government. The classical typology 
includes not only three “pure” forms: 1) “autocracy” (better known as “monarchy”) as the 
government of one --i.e. the monarch; 2) “aristocracy” as the government of few --i.e. the 
better ones; and 3) “democracy” as the government of all --i.e. the people. But also three 
“impure” forms: 1) “tyranny” as the government of one --i.e. the tyrant; 2) “oligarchy” as 
the government of few --i.e. the rich; and 3) “demagogy” as the government of many (on 
behalf of all) --i.e. the poor (or the mob). 
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It is worth to mention that Aristotle considered “democracy” pejoratively, an 
equivalent to the term “demagogy”, as one vicious extreme in contraposition to 
“oligarchy” as the other vicious extreme, whereas his politeia was the virtuous middle 
term by comprising the government of both the poor and the rich (Aristotle 1988: 97-8). 
Let me explain that, different to him, I will reserve “demagogy” for the “impure” form 
and “democracy” for the “pure” one. But similar to him, I will assume that the latter is 
the government of all the people: not only of both the poor and the rich but also of both 
the many and the few (or alternatively of both the majority and the minority). 
The problem is that for some authors “democracy” seems to be reduced to the 
government of the many or of the majority in detriment of the few or of the minority, a 
so-called majoritarian or populist democracy. On the contrary, a true “democracy” and 
democratic government must be neither of poor or rich, nor of many or few (nor of 
majority or minority), but of all: both of poor and rich, both of many and few (both of 
majority and minority). 
 So far the notion of “democracy” as a form of government and the typology has 
served to emphasize the ownership (or partnership) “of” the political or sovereign power, 
depending on whether it corresponds to one, few, many, or all. Nevertheless, the exercise 
of this political or sovereign power not only must be done directly and indirectly “by” its 
owners (or partners) and their --legitimate-- representatives, but also must be done “for” 
them and their benefit, not in their detriment. The three ideas already sketched can be put 
together into an integral definition, such as the one embodied in Abraham Lincoln’s 
maxim and in the “Preamble” of the Fifth French Republic’s motto: “government of the 
people, by the people, for the people” (Lincoln 1863/1990: 308; the emphasis is mine).  
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 In that sense, a true “democracy” must be the government of, by and for all the 
people: poor and rich, many and few… men and women, heterosexuals and homosexuals, 
believers and non-believers... and so on. Hence, I will consider “democracy” as the 
“government of all the people, by all the people --directly on their own (“direct 
democracy”) or indirectly through their representatives (“representative democracy”) -- 
and for all the people” (Flores 2005a: 154-7; and 2008a: 314-9). 
 However, as stated a couple of paragraphs above, the problem is that there are two 
competing and conflicting conceptions of democracy. As far as I know the distinction can 
be traced all the way back to John Stuart Mill, who, in his Considerations on 
Representative Government, under the epigraph “Of True and False Democracy: 
Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority Only”, indicated: 
Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name democracy. The pure 
idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by 
the whole people, equally represented. Democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto 
practiced is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, 
exclusively represented. The former is synonymous with the equality of all citizens; the 
latter, strangely confounded with it, is a government of privilege, in favor of the 
numerical majority, who alone possess practically any voice in the State. This is the 
inevitable consequence of the manner in which the votes are now taken, to the complete 
disfranchisement of minorities (Mill 1861/1958: 102). 
 In Dworkin’s perspective, at the present time, the two competing conceptions of 
democracy not only coexist but also are still in conflict: 
The two views of democracy that are in contest are these. According to the majoritarian 
view, democracy is government by majority will, that is, in accordance with the will of 
the greatest number of people, expressed in elections with universal or near universal 
suffrage. There is no guarantee that a majority will decide fairly; its decisions may be 
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unfair to minorities whose interests the majority systematically ignores. If so, then the 
democracy is unjust but no less democratic for that reason. According to the rival 
partnership view of democracy, however, democracy means that the people govern 
themselves each as a full partner in a collective political enterprise so that a majority’s 
decisions are democratic only when certain further conditions are met that protect the 
status and interests of each citizen as a full partner in that enterprise. On the partnership 
view, a community that steadily ignores the interests of some minority or other group is 
just for that reason not democratic even though it elects officials impeccably majoritarian 
means. This is only a very sketchy account of the partnership conception, however. If we 
find the more familiar majoritarian conception unsatisfactory, we shall have to develop 
the partnership view in more detail (Dworkin 2006: 131). 
 Actually, as he acknowledges, the United States of America is neither a pure 
example of the majoritarian conception of democracy nor of the non-majoritarian (or 
partnership) one. Although the bipartisan system and the majority rule reinforced the 
former, since the founding fathers limited the power of the majorities in various forms, by 
including anti-majoritarian devices, which were latter reinforced by other institutions, 
such as the filibuster and the judicial review (of the constitutionality) of the acts of the 
other (elected) branches of government, it can be said that they also supported the latter 
(Dworkin 2006: 137 and 135).2 On one side, a minority of either thirty-four or forty-one 
(out of the one-hundred senators) can block the majority of bringing a decision to a final 
vote, depending on whether it is a substantive or procedural issue. And, on the other, the 
                                                
2 In fact, the existence of the Senate was designed to divide the most dangerous branch of 
government and to give stability to the government by protecting the minorities against a speedy and 
unreflected legislative majority in the House of Representatives. For an illustration of the filibuster, vid. 
Frank Capra’s film “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington” (1939). 
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power of the political majorities is limited by the recognition of individual constitutional 
rights that legislative majorities cannot infringe and much less step over. 
 Aside, Dworkin alerts that the degraded state of the public debate endangers the 
partnership conception of democracy and strengthens the majoritarian one, including 
viewing the other as an enemy and politics as a war: 
If we aim to be a partnership democracy… the degraded state of our political argument 
does count as a serious defect in our democracy because mutual attention and respect are 
the essence of partnership. We do not treat someone with whom we disagree as a partner 
--we treat him as an enemy or at best as an obstacle-- when we make no effort either to 
understand the force of his contrary views or to develop our own opinions in a way that 
makes them responsive to his. The partnership model so described seems unattainable 
now because it is difficult to see how Americans on rival sides of the supposed culture 
wars could come to treat each other with that mutual respect and attention (Dworkin 
2006: 132-3). 
B. Polarization 
Since the term “polarization” is ambiguous and as such considered either as an activity-
process or product-result (of such activity-process) we must stipulate our use of them. 
Accordingly we are going to reserve the verb “polarize” to the activity-process and 
“polarization” for the product-result. On one side, “polarize” means to “cause division of 
opinion: to make the differences between groups or ideas ever more clear-cut and 
extreme, hardening the opposition between them, or become ever more clear-cut and 
extreme in this way.” On the other, “polarization” means “concentration, as of groups, 
forces, or interests, about two conflicting or contrasting positions” and of which a rational 
conciliation seems highly or near to impossible (for example, between those for and 
against: abortion, death penalty, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, and so on). By the same 
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token, the polarization describes the formation of antagonistic (social) classes or groups 
and its confrontation (verbi gratia: bourgeois-proletariat, capitalist-socialists, 
conservative-liberal, democratic-republican, left-right, moderate-radical, poor-rich, rural-
urban, and so on). 
 Anyway, we can distinguish between two great options regarding polarization: (1) 
exclusion of one group by the other or (2) inclusion of one group by the other. Similarly, 
each option can be further divided into two theses: one strong and the other weak. On one 
side, in case of exclusion: (A) the strong version is characterized by the annihilation, 
elimination, execution, extinction, or suppression of the “different”, especially if 
“dissident”, which is considered as an “enemy”, i.e. ethnic cleansing or mass deportation, 
and may lead to an “authoritarian or totalitarian imposition-restoration”; and (B) the weak 
version is depicted by the division, excision, fragmentation, secession, or separation into 
two or more parts, which are not willing to cooperate, i.e. balkanization for short, and 
may lead to a “libertarian emancipation”. On the other, in case of inclusion: (C) the 
strong version is illustrated by the agitation, confrontation, convulsion, or tension 
between majorities-minorities and may lead to a “majoritarian or minoritarian 
tyrannization”;3 and (D) the weak version is portrayed by the deliberation, discussion, 
participation or representation of all partners and may lead to a (pure or true) “democratic 
association”. 
                                                
3 Elsewhere I have characterized these different situations as “majoritycracy”, i.e. “government of 
the majority”; and, as “minoritycracy” (i.e. “government of the minority”); and even as “partycracy”, i.e. 
“government of political parties”) (Flores 2005a: 159; and 2008a: 338-9). 
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 From the preceding lines, it is possible to derive four different characterizations of 
“polarization”: two of which are openly incompatible with any conception of democracy 
--(A) and (B); and, two of which are presumably compatible with democracy: one with 
the majoritarian conception --(C); and, other with the partnership conception --(D). 
Since there is not much of democratic in (A) and (B), we will analyze only the two 
versions presumably compatible with democracy in the search for the one that is purely 
or truly so. In (C) polarization is recognized either as the oppression of minorities by 
majorities or the opposition of minorities against majorities to the extent that it is 
coherent with the majoritarian conception, and as historical example we can mention the 
case of Venice. On the contrary, in (D) polarization is renowned as the association 
between both majorities and minorities to the extent that it is consistent with the 
partnership conception, and as historical example we can mention the case of Florence.4 
Nowadays, we tend to attribute to “polarization” a negative connotation, but 
“democracy” has not necessarily a positive one, keep in mind Winston Churchill’s speech 
where he characterized democracy as a “lesser evil” in the continuum: “Many forms of 
government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one 
pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is 
the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time 
to time” (Churchill 1947/1979: 150). Let me elucidate, I am trying to suggest that it may 
be the case that at least one form of “polarization” is a “lesser evil” for democracy than 
other tendencies, including those of “non-polarization”. Therefore, I not only conceive 
                                                
4 I am grateful to Mario Conetti for pointing me to the historical cases of Venice and Florence as 
representative of the majoritarian and the partnership conceptions, respectively. 
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“polarization” as an opportunity for “democracy” and not necessarily as the problem in 
itself but also perceive that the partnership conception of democracy is better suited than 
the majoritarian to deal with polarization. Let me suggest that the latter by either trying to 
avoid or confront polarization might end up increasing it or even multiplying it, whereas 
the former by trying to engage or face polarization through a serious public debate might 
wind up decreasing it or reducing it. 
3. Conditions of Possibility of Democracy 
Let me advance that as a working hypothesis, we are going to criticize and reject any 
answer to the question on whether democracy is possible that runs from an absolute 
pessimism or even skepticism in one extreme (“not here, nor there, nor anywhere”) to an 
unlimited optimism in the other extreme (“here, there and everywhere”). On the contrary, 
we pretend that it is possible here, there and everywhere, if and only if certain conditions 
are met, despite of being a polarized society. Instead of being before a fatality proper of 
Cassandra, who foresees the future but can not do anything to change it; we are before a 
great opportunity proper of Pollyanna, who sees in every situation despite its bad or 
negative side the possibility of finding a good or positive point (Crozier et al. 1975: 3). 
In this part, we are going to revise the conditions of possibility of a democracy by 
recalling: firstly, the Report of the Trilateral Commission of mid-1970s, in general, and 
the part on the United States of America prepared by Samuel P. Huntington, in particular; 
and, secondly, the so-called “false promises of democracy”, following Norberto Bobbio’s 
characterization, which will lead us into considering some substantive ideals for 
democracy. 
1. The Crisis of Democracy (and the Third Wave of Democratization) 
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In the “Introductory Note” to the book published in 1975 as The Crisis of Democracy, but 
well known simply as Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral 
Commission, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1975) clarifies that despite the frequency and 
insistence with which it is asked: Is democracy in crisis? The authors of the book 
consider that “democratic systems are viable”. But, deemed that it is necessary that the 
“people truly understands the nature of the democratic system” and for that purpose 
“reexamine its basic premises and functioning”. 
 On this regard, the authors of the Report identify three different challenges for the 
democratic government: 1) Contextual (and External), such as a world economic crisis 
which can lead to serious problems for the functioning of democracy; 2) (Contextual and) 
Internal, such as the social structure and social tendencies within the country; and 3) 
Intrinsic, which are proper to the functioning of a democracy, to the extent that: “The 
more democratic a system is, indeed, the more likely it is to be endangered by intrinsic 
threats.” In a few words: “The demands on democratic government grow, while the 
capacity of democratic government stagnates.” (Crozier et al., 1975: 8-9) As Huntington 
observed, in the part devoted to the Unites States of America:  
The vitality of democracy in the United States in the 1960s produced a substantial 
increase in governmental activity and a substantial decrease in governmental authority. 
By the early 1970s Americans were progressively demanding and receiving more 
benefits from their government and yet having less confidence in their government than 
they had a decade earlier… The vitality of democracy in the 1960s raised questions about 
the economic solvency of government; the decrease in governmental authority produced 
doubts about the political solvency of government. The impulse of democracy is to make 
government less powerful and more active, to increase its functions, and to decrease its 
authority (Huntington 1975: 64; emphasis is original). 
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 Albeit, he questioned, among other things: “Does an increase in the vitality of 
democracy necessarily have to mean a decrease in the governability of democracy?” 
(Huntington 1975: 64; emphasis is original) Besides, he accepts that the diminution of the 
governmental authority can be explained by the increase in political participation and the 
decrease in the levels of trust of the people toward the government. Similarly, he 
remembers: “During the 1960s public opinion on major issues of public policy tended to 
become more polarized and ideologically structured, that is, people tended to hold more 
consistent liberal or conservative attitudes on public policy issues.” (Huntington 1975: 
76). And insinuated that there were two reasons of why: 1) the nature of the themes 
themselves, which included social, racial and military matters; and 2) the features of 
those who participate actively in politics tended to have consistent and systematic 
perspectives on matters of public policy; and hence: “The increase in political 
participation in the early 1960s was thus followed by heightened polarization of political 
opinion in the mid-1960s” (Huntington 1975: 77). 
In this way, Huntington explains not only the appearance of polarization in a 
democracy but also its causes and consequences or effects: 
The polarization over issues in the mid-1960s in part, at least, explains the major decline 
in trust and confidence in government of the latter 1960s. Increasingly, substantial 
portions of the American public took more extreme positions on policy issues; those who 
took more extreme positions on policy issues, in turn, tended to become more distrustful 
of government. Polarization over issues generated distrust about government, as those 
who had strong positions on issues became dissatisfied with the ambivalent, 
compromising policies of government. Political leaders, in effect, alienated more and 
more people by attempting to please them through the time-honored traditional politics of 
compromise (Huntington 1975: 78). 
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 In addition, he explains that there is a cyclical process of interaction between 
political participation-polarization-distrust-political efficaciousness, in which 
(Huntington 1975: 84):  
(1) An increase in the political participation leads to an increase in the polarization of 
the public policies; 
(2) An increase in the polarization of public policies leads to an increase in the distrust 
of the people and a decrease in the political efficaciousness of the government; and 
(3) An increase in the distrust and a decrease in the political efficaciousness of the 
government lead to a decrease in the political participation. 
The result of this cyclical process is a paradox: an increase in political 
participation will at the end lead to a decrease in political participation: “an upsurge of 
political participation produces conditions which favor a downswing in political 
participation.” (Huntington 1975: 85) Similarly, he points out that the decrease in 
political participation produces conditions that favor the decadence of the party system, 
including party-identification, party-votation and party-cohesion. 
Although, Huntington advices “The single most important status variable 
affecting political participation and attitudes is education”, (Huntington 1975: 110) he 
still admits: 
The governability of a democracy depends upon the relation between the authority of its 
governing institutions and the power of its opposition institutions. In a parliamentary 
system, the authority of the cabinet depends upon the balance of power between the 
governing parties and the opposition parties in the legislature. In the United States, the 
authority of government depends upon the balance of power between a broad coalition of 
governing institutions and groups, which includes but transcends the legislature and other 
formal institutions of government, and the power of those institutions and groups which 
are committed to opposition (Huntington 1975: 91-2). 
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 It seems that the way out from the tension between democracy and polarization, 
besides requiring greater levels of education of the citizenry, depends in the relation 
between the government or ruling party and its opposition; or, alternately, in the 
relationship between the ruling majority and the opposing minority. What’s more, in the 
conclusion of the Report, the authors emphasize the necessity of searching and even 
reaching a common agreement or shared purpose.5 They illuminate, on one side: “In a 
democracy… purpose cannot be imposed from on high by fiat.” (Crozier et al., 1975: 
160) And, on the other:  
Without common purpose, there is no basis for common priorities, and without priorities, 
there are no grounds for distinguishing among competing private interests and claims. 
Conflicting goals and specialized interests crowd in one upon another, with executives, 
cabinets, parliaments, and bureaucrats lacking the criteria to discriminate among them. 
The system becomes one of anomic democracy, in which democratic politics becomes 
more an arena for the assertion of conflicting interests than a process for the building of 
common purposes (Crozier et al., 1975: 161). 
Analogously, as we have already seen, Dworkin had appreciated that, on one side, 
a democracy can be and remain healthy in no-polarization situations despite lacking a 
serious public debate as long as there is a broad consensus about what must be done. 
And, on the other, a democracy can be and remain healthy even in polarization situations 
in spite of missing a shared consensus about what must be done as long as there is a 
culture of public debate. 
                                                
5 Even the most polarized society can reach a common agreement or shared purpose: sometimes in 
the form of a common cause or enemy.  
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It seems that democracy is identified with a widespread consensus among all the 
participants or partners and when it is not possible to reach one with a serious public 
debate. It is the public debate which facilitates reaching a consensus by finding ex post a 
common agreement or purpose (as a staring point): first, having a public debate; and, 
later, if necessary, voting; and not the other way around. By the by, this view reinforces 
the “partnership conception” and makes democracy possible regardless of polarization. 
On the contrary, if polarization is said to be so deep as to cancel the possibility of 
finding a momentous consensus via a common agreement or purpose and of having a 
serious public debate, it seems that the only thing left is to vote to see who has ex ante the 
bigger number: lacking a public debate and going directly into voting, as the slogan 
“Let’s vote” puts forward.6 But as Edmund Burke criticized: “It is said, that twenty-four 
millions ought to prevail over two hundred thousand. True; if the constitution of a 
kingdom be a problem of arithmetic.” (Burke, 1790/1937: 190) By the way, this view 
reinforces the “majoritarian conception” and leads towards not only the majoritarian or 
minoritarian tyrannization but also to oppression-opposition and even more polarization. 
B. The false promises of democracy (and the future of democracy) 
When Bobbio published, in 1984, the book titled Il futuro della democrazia (i.e. The 
Future of Democracy), he warned --in the first chapter, which gives the name to the 
collection of essays-- about the existence of six false promises of democracy (Bobbio, 
1986: 23-42): 
1. The birth of the pluralist society; 
                                                
6 Elsewhere I claim that there are limits to majority decision making and voting (Flores 2006; 2008b; 
and 2010a), such as issuing an amnesty with absoulte pardons and without truth commissions. I am grateful 
to Mariela Morales Antoniazzi for pointing out this case to me. 
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2. The renewed vigor of particular interests; 
3. The survival of oligarchies; 
4. The limited space to participate; 
5. The subsistence of the invisible power; and  
6. The uneducated citizen. 
 Apparently, the Italian jurist and political scientist was charging democracy of 
having promised: 
First, to give birth to a uniformed and united society, but instead it has delivered 
not only a diversified and divided society but also a pluralized and even a polarized or 
radicalized one, characterized as “poliarchy” or “poliarchical” society by Robert A. Dahl 
(1956; 1967; 1972; and 1981; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953). However, as we have already 
proposed, it is not necessary to achieve an ample consensus between all the “poles”, but 
at least possible to initiate a serious public debate between all of them: parties, partners or 
poles. 
Second, to vindicate the interests of the people, but since it is impossible to have 
all the people permanently gathered or constantly called upon to make or take directly by 
them all the decisions (“direct democracy”), the option was to elect their representatives, 
who will make or take indirectly all the decisions for them and supposedly on their behalf 
(“representative democracy”). It is worth to mention that the (political) representation  
has relied on the principles that the representatives must resemble the constituencies and 
look after the general or public interests, but is not necessarily considered as an agent or 
delegate acting “for them” and dependent of their lead, but mainly as a trustee acting “on 
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their behalf” and somehow independent of them, and to some had reinforced on the 
contrary of the particular or private interests (Pitkin 1967; Flores 2005b: 30-1).7 
 Third, to unify the economic conditions by controlling the oligarchy and 
restricting the appearance of ruling elites or groups linked directly to them and their 
interests. But the presence not only of oligarchies but also of economic differences 
between rich and poor, and even worse between prosperity and poverty, as well as the 
subsistence of elites, reinforces the picture portrayed by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1947) 
who pointed out that those ruling elites and groups organized through political parties 
compete against each other in the hunt for votes. As you can imagine, I am neither 
against the existence of such elites or groups as such, nor the fact of the competition 
against each other, as long as they are willing to enter into a serious public debate, not a 
mere façade and even worse a battling ground or war. 
 Fourth, to open and even multiply spaces for the participation (and representation) 
of all, but they remain closed and once they are opened remain limited or restricted to a 
very few. The representation, as we have seen, becomes a mere delegation, whereas the 
participation is reduced to its minimal expression with periodic elections, (near to) 
universal suffrage, and a more or less direct, free, secret and popular vote. Likewise, the 
very few open spaces are limited or restricted to political parties and, as a consequence, 
the participation --and representation-- of all is reduced only to a few and mainly 
                                                
7 Elsewhere I have criticized the tendency that Guillermo O’Donnell labeled as “delegative 
democracy” as the “government of the people by their delegates” (O’Donnell 1993a; and 1993b; and 
Flores, 2008a: 338). 
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mediated by them. What’s more, there are still vast groups of society marginalized of the 
political process (Flores, 1998; 1999; and 2002). 
 Fifth, to make the exercise of power much more transparent and visible to the 
citizen, who will not only can participate of it, but also should know the actions of the 
government and check them, to the extent that democracy also means government before 
the people or accountable to them. Moreover, as we have already seen, the demands on 
the government have increased, while its capacity of response decreased, leading towards 
an exercise of power through bureaucratic and technical apparatus, such as bureaucracy, 
i.e. the government of the bureaucrat, and technocracy, i.e. the government of the 
technician, which are neither transparent nor visible to the citizen, who remains left out of 
the loop and the invisible power is still there (Weber 1922/1968: 956-1012; Flores 1998: 
96-7; and 1999: 202-3). 
 Sixth, to educate all the citizens and to guarantee equality of opportunities, but 
instead of having active and (well-)informed citizens, the ruling class(es) and elite(s) 
seem to prefer passive and non-informed ones, who remained subjects and not (truly) 
citizens and less partners in self-government. The lack of education is, as we have already 
pointed out following Huntington, one of the obstacles for democracy and a pending 
matter if we are truly committed towards democracy, specially, in the substantive 
partnership conception. 
 Let me recall that Bobbio --and a vast majority of his disciples and followers-- has 
emphasized the procedural conception over the substantial one and has insisted in a 
minimal definition of democracy “characterized by a set of rules (primary or basic) which 
establish who is authorized to take collective decisions and which procedures are to be 
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applied.” (Bobbio 1984/1987: 24) Actually, the subtitle of his book, in the English 
translation, is precisely “A Defense of the Rules of the Game” and as such an apology of 
the procedural conception of democracy. Notwithstanding, he enunciates that in spite of 
everything:  
[M]y conclusion is that the broken promises and the unforeseen obstacles which I have 
surveyed here are not sufficient to ‘transform’ a democratic regime into an autocratic one. 
The essential difference between the first and the second has been preserved. The 
minimal content of the democratic state has not been impaired: guarantees of the basic 
liberties, the existence of competing parties, periodic elections with universal suffrage, 
decisions which are collective or the result of compromise… or made on the basis of the 
majority principle, or in any event as the outcome of open debate between the different 
factions or allies of a government coalition (Bobbio 1984/1987: 40). 
 Anyway, before ending, he adds surprisingly to his notion of democracy, as the 
(procedural) rules of the game, a (substantive) appeal to values, by accepting that “ideals 
are necessary” (Bobbio 1984/1987: 41) and among them he enumerates (Bobbio 
1984/1987: 41-2):  
1. The ideal of toleration; 
2. The ideal of non-violence; 
3. The ideal of the gradual renewal of society via the free debate of ideas and the 
modification of attitudes and ways of life; and 
4. The ideal of brotherhood. 
As you can see the ideals of toleration (without fanatisms) and of free debate of 
ideas (without preconceived or predetermined truths) coincide with the serious public 
debate, on one hand, and the ideals of non-violence (in peaceful contexts) and 
brotherhood --or fraternity-- (with common agreements and shared purposes) correspond 
to the mutual or reciprocal attention and respect that is due, on the other hand. Although, 
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Bobbio insists openly on a procedural --and as such majoritarian-- conception, he admits 
covertly on the substantial --and as such a partnership--conception by adding the 
necessity of ideals and by appealing to values, as well as by requiring decisions --
regardless of the collective process, compromise between parties or the fact of being 
made according to the majority rule-- to be the “outcome of open debate” between the 
different parts of the whole. 
Finally, as Dworkin has emphasized: 
The majoritarian conception purports to be purely procedural and therefore independent 
of other dimensions of political morality; it allows us to say, as I indicated, that a decision 
is democratic even if it is very unjust. But the partnership conception does not make 
democracy independent of the rest of political morality; on that conception we need a 
theory of equal partnership to decide what is or is not a democratic decision, and we need 
to consult ideas about justice, equality, and liberty in order to construct such a theory. So 
on the partnership conception, democracy is a substantive, not a merely procedural, ideal 
(Dworkin 2006, 134). 
IV. Conclusion 
As we have seen a pure or true democracy implies not the necessity of a momentous 
consensus but the possibility of a serious public debate, which facilitates the quest for 
common agreement and shared purpose, starting with mutual and reciprocal attention and 
respect. Therefore, it is necessary the participation and representation of all the citizens, 
including a better and greater education of all the people, men and women, poor and rich, 
religious and secular, old and young; a political system opened, not closed, characterized 
by the existence of political parties, but neither limited to them nor reduced to election 
day or voting; and a closer relationship between government or ruling party and 
opposition, majority and minority… characterized by the collaboration of all, through 
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deliberation and discussion of the different themes, in the name not only of general 
interest and not in the particular, partial o party interest, but also of what unites all and 
not what divides them from us. 
V. References 
Aristotle (1988), The Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bobbio, N. (1984/1987), “The Future of Democracy”, in The Future of Democracy: A 
Defense of the Rules of the Game, trans. Roger Griffin, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Brzezinski, Z. (1975), “Introductory Note”, in Michael Crozier et al., The Crisis of 
Democracy. Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral 
Commission, New York: New York University Press.  
Burke, E. (1790/1937), Reflections on the Revolution in France, and on the Proceedings 
in Certain Societies in London Relative that Event in a Letter Intended to Have 
Been Sent to Gentleman in Paris, New York: P.F. Collier and Son Corporation. 
Churchill, W. (1947/1979), “Parliament Bill. Speech on the House of Commons, 
November 11, 1947”, in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 3rd ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Crozier, M. et al. (1975), The Crisis of Democracy. Report on the Governability of 
Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, New York: New York University 
Press. 
Dahl, R. (1956), A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
______________ (1967), Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and 
Consent, Chicago: Rand McVally & Co. 
 23 
______________ (1972), Democracy in the United States: Promise and Performance, 
Chicago: Rand McVally & Co. 
______________ (1981), Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. Autonomy versus Control, 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Dahl, R. and Lindblom, C. (1953), Politics, Economics, and Welfare, New York: Harper 
& Brothers. 
Dworkin, R. (2006), Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Flores, I. B. (1998), “Crisis, fortalecimiento y valores de la democracia”, in Los valores 
de la democracia, México: Instituto Federal Electoral. 
______________ (1999), “Democracia y participación: Consideraciones sobre la 
representación política”, in J. Jesús Orozco Henríquez (ed.), Democracia y 
representación en el umbral del siglo XXI. Memoria del Tercer Congreso 
Internacional de Derecho Electoral, Vol. I, México: Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México. 
_____________ (2002), “Gobernabilidad y representatividad: Hacia un sistema 
democrático electoral mayoritario y proporcional”, in Hugo A. Concha Cantú 
(ed.), Memoria del VII Congreso Iberoamericano de Derecho Constitucional, 
Vol. IV, México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 
____________  (2005a), “Heráclito vis-à-vis Parménides: Cambio y permanencia como 
la principal función del derecho en una democracia incipiente”, in Luis J. Molina 
Piñeiro et al. (eds.) Funciones del derecho en las democracias incipientes. El 
caso de México, México: Porrúa and Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 
 24 
____________  (2005b), “The Quest for Legisprudence: Constitutionalism v. Legalism”, 
in Luc J. Wintgens (ed.), The Theory and Practice of Legislation: Essays on 
Legisprudence, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
____________ (2006), “Sobre las formas y los límites de la legislación: A propósito de la 
constitucionalidad de una reforma constitucional”, in Diego Valadés and Miguel 
Carbonell (eds.), El estado constitucional contemporáneo. Culturas y sistemas 
jurídicos comparados, Vol. I, México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México. 
_____________ (2008a), “Actores, procesos e instituciones democráticas: Hacia una 
verdadera democracia en México”, in Luis J. Molina Piñeiro et al. (eds.), 
Instituciones, Actores y Procesos Democráticos en México 2007, México: Porrúa 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 
___________ (2008b), Sobre los límites de las reformas constitucionales: A propósito de 
tres acciones de inconstitucionalidad recientes, in Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor 
and Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea (eds.), La ciencia del derecho procesal 
constitucional. Estudios en Homenaje a Héctor Fix-Zamudio en sus cincuenta 
años como  investigador del derecho, Vol. VIII Procesos Constitucionales 
Orgánicos, México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 
____________ (2009), ¿Es posible la democracia en México?, in Luis J. Molina Piñeiro 
et al. (eds.), ¿Polarización en las expectativas democráticas de México 2008-
2009? Presidencialismo, Congreso de la Unión, órganos electorales, 
pluripartidismo y liderazgo, México: Porrúa, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
 25 
México, Instituto de Derechos Humanos “Bartolomé de las Casas”-Universidad 
Carlos III de Madrid and COPUEX. 
______________ (2010a), “Estado de derecho y legislación: El problema de la regla de la 
mayoría”, in Jaime Labastida and Violeta Aréchiga (eds.), Identidad y Diferencia, 
Vol. I La política y la Cultura, México: Siglo XXI. 
______________ (2010b), “Democracia y polarización: ¿(in)compatibilidad?”, in Luis T. 
Díaz Müller (ed.), V Jornadas: Crisis y derechos humanos, México: Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México. 
Huntington, S. (1975), “Chapter III. The United States”, in Crozier, Michael et al., The 
Crisis of Democracy. Report on the Governability of Democracies to the 
Trilateral Commission, New York: New York University Press. 
Lincoln, A. (1863/1990), “The Gettysburg Address, November 19, 1863”, in Lincoln on 
Democracy, New York: Harper Collins. 
Mill, J. S. (1861/1958), Considerations on Representative Government, Indianapolis: The 
Liberal Arts Press.  
O’Donnell, G. (1993a), “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems 
(A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-communist Countries)”, 
Kellogg Institute Working Paper, No. 192, April, in: 
http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/192.pdf. 
______________ (1993b), “Delegative Democracy?”, in: 
http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/172.pdf. 
Pitkin, H. F. (1967), The Concept of Representation, Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
 26 
Schumpeter, J. (1947), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper & 
Bros.  
Weber, M. (1922/1968), Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, 
New York: Bedminister Press. 
